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Nearly  all  policymakers  agree  that  the  current  welfare  system  is  badly  in 
need  of  reform.  Many  argue  that  it  offers  too  few  incentives  to  work  and 
almost  no  means  by  which  to  obtain  employment.  Moreover,  the  tax 
structure  penalizes  low-income  workers  so  that  those  who  can  find  a  job 
have  little  reason  to  remain  employed. 
In  this  P&c  P&q  i3tief,  Levy  Institute  Resident  Research  Associate 
Oren  M.  Levin-Waldman  argues  that  the  economic  incentives  in  the 
current  system  provide  little  reason  for  many  mothers  receiving  benefits 
to  enter  the  work  force,  given  that  it  is  likely  that  they  would  be 
employed  in  low-paying  jobs  offering  no  benefits.  Levin-Waldman  sug- 
gests  that  the  current  array  of  benefits  be  restructured  into  a  consolidat- 
ed  assistance  program  that  would  not  eliminate  benefits  altogether,  but 
would  give  welfare  recipients  the  necessary  economic  incentive  to  work. 
In  order  to  evaluate  the  variety  of  measures  that  have  been  proposed  and 
to  gain  perspective  on  the  debate  about  welfare  reform,  we  should  recall 
the  function  the  original  welfare  system  was  designed  to  perform.  As 
Levin-Waldman  notes,  “the  initial  welfare  state  was  not  designed  to 
encourage  women  with  children  to  work,  but  rather,  to  keep  them 
home.”  Today’s  emphasis  on  encouraging  mothers  to  work  is  a  dmstically 
different  goal,  reflecting  changes  in  the  structure  of  the  l&or  force,  the 
family,  and  women’s  role  in  society.  When  we  place  welfare  in  this  con- 
text,  it  comes  as  no  surprise  that  the  system  does  not  contain  the  cco- 
nomic  incentives  espoused  by  many  in  the  current  debate. 
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As  Levin-Waldman  suggests,  additional  incentives  to  work  could  be 
instituted  through  a  restructuring  and  coordination  of  existing  programs 
such  as  the  earned  income  tax  credit  (EITC).  Recent  hearings  by  the 
Senate  Governmental  Affairs  Committee  indicate  that  structural 
changes  should  be  made  to  the  EITC  to  address  problems  stemming  from 
fraudulent  claims.  The  existence  of  fraud  does  not  imply  that  the  EITC 
should  be  eliminated  or  benefits  reduced;  rather,  restructuring  efforts  to 
address  problems  associated  with  fraud  provide  an  excellent  opportunity 
to  redesign  the  EITC  also  to  target  its  intended  audience  more  efficient- 
ly  and  to  coordinate  better  with  other  programs. 
The  issues  surrounding  welfare  reform  are  complex,  and  many  factors 
influence  a  mother’s  decision  about  whether  she  can  or  will  enter  the 
work  force.  Access  to  affordable  health  and  child  care,  adequate  educa- 
tion,  and  job  training  are  all  factors  in  the  work  decision.  Lack  of  pater- 
nal  responsibility,  high  rates  of  out-of-wedlock  births  and  teenage  preg- 
nancy,  and  the  trade-off  (especially  for  single  mothers)  between  time 
spent  working  and  time  spent  rearing  children  must  also  be  addressed 
before  any  effective  reform  of  the  current  welfare  system  can  take  place. 
The  proposals  in  this  Brief  address  some  of  these  issues,  but  they  should 
be  viewed  as  one  part  of  a  larger  strategy  that  would  deal  with  all  the 
issues  confronting  the  welfare  system. 
Dimitri  B.  Papadimitriou 
Executive  Director 
May  1995 
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During  the  1992  presidential  campaign,  candidate  Bill  Clinton  pledged 
to  end  welfare  as  we  know  it.  He  made  it  clear  thar  those  who  played  by 
the  rules  and  worked  should  not  live  in  poverty.  As  president,  Clinton 
proposed  a  two-year  time  limit  on  welfare  benefits,  after  which  benefi- 
ciaries  would  be  required  to  work;  for  those  unable  to  find  work,  the 
government  would  provide  assistance  in  the  form  of  a  minimum-wage, 
public  sector  job.  For  low-income  workers,  additional  assistance  would 
be  provided  through  an  expansion  of  the  earned  income  tax  credit 
(EITC),  a  measure  designed  to  reduce  the  cost  of  payroll  taxes.  The 
expansion  of  the  EITC,  legislated  under  the  Omnibus  Budget 
Reconciliation  Act  of  1993  (OBRA  93),  was  aimed  not  only  at  provid- 
ing  low-income  workers  with  additional  assistance,  but  also  at  comple- 
menting  the  president’s  plans  for  welfare  reform  by  offering  an  additional 
incentive  for  those  receiving  public  assistance  benefits  to  enter  the  labor 
market. 
However,  the  expansion  of  the  EITC  provides  only  a  small  amount  of 
tax  relief  to  lower-middle-class  workers  (those  earning  up  to  $27,000). 
As  laudable  as  this  relief  might  be,  it  is  questionable  whether  it  is  stiffi+ 
cient  to  induce  those  on  welfare  to  forsake  public  benefits  for  the  world 
of  work.  Moreover,  when  the  EITC  interacts  with  other  public  assis- 
tance  programs,  it  is  questionable  whether  the  entire  array  of  benefits 
produces  any  added  incentive  to  work. 
In  this  B+f  I  intend  to  show  that  the  current  benefit  package  does  not 
offer  sufficient  incentives  for  recipients  to  enter  the  work  force.  In  view 
of  this  failure,  we  must  ask  what  can  be  done  to  create  a  system  that 
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would  offer  such  incentives.  Will  merely  expanding  the  EITC  or  adding 
another  program  to  the  current  package  be  sufficient  to  counteract  its 
disincentives?  I  suggest  that  a  synchronization  of  benefits-a  plan  con- 
solidating  existing  programs  into  a  more  integrated  system-is  needed. 
The  EITC,  while  not  a  bad  program  in  and  of  itself,  in  conjunction  with 
the  current  array  of  public  assistance  programs  is  simply  insufficient  to 
offer  such  incentives.  I  therefore  offer  a  plan  that  would  synchronize  and 
consolidate  existing  benefit  programs  by  combining  elements  of  the 
EITC  and  other  programs  into  one  program,  the  consolidated  assistance 
program  (CAP).  This  paper  intends  to  argue  that  a  program  composed  of 
a  two-tiered  assistance  component  (one  tier  for  working  parents  and  the 
other  for  nonworking  parents)  and  a  child  support  component  would 
assure  minimal  subsistence  to  those  unable  to  work  while  providing  posi- 
tive  incentives  for  those  on  welfare  to  work  without  in  effect  punishing 
them  in  the  process.  Such  a  program  would  accomplish  welfare  reform 
more  efficiently  and  effectively  than  a  plan  that  would  simply  expand 
the  EITC  and  place  a  time  limit  on  benefits. 
Overview of the  Major  Existing Welfare Pmgrams 
Welfare  for  the  poor  consists  of  a  wide  array  of  programs,  including  Aid 
to  Families  with  Dependent  Children  (AFDC),  food  stamps,  the 
Women,  Infants  and  Children  (WIG)  program,  Medicaid  (medical  assis- 
tance  for  the  indigent),  public  housing  assistance,  school  lunch  pro- 
grams,  nutrition  programs,  supplemental  income  programs,  and,  most 
recently,  the  EITC.  This  I3tief  focuses  on  AFDC,  food  stamps,  Medicaid, 
and  EITC  benefits  and  attempts  to  establish  whether  the  EITC  as  it  is 
currently  structured  is  sufficient  to  offset  the  disincentive  effects  of  a 
welfare  package  consisting  of  AFDC,  food  stamps,  and  Medicaid. 
Aid  to  Families  with  Dependent  Children 
AFDC  is  the  basic  welfare  program  and  is  the  program  we  perhaps  are 
most  familiar  with.  It  is  a  children’s  program  that  provides  benefits 
through  assistance  to  their  mothers.  AFDC  is  a  cooperative  program 
between  the  states  and  the  federal  government.  The  federal  government 
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establishes  minimum  benefit  levels  and  provides  funding  to  the  states, 
and  the  states  determine  actual  benefit  levels  and  program  eligibility. 
In  fiscal  year  (FY)  1993,  14.1  million  recipients  collected  $22.3  billion 
in  AFDC  benefits.  Consolidated  into  family  units,  there  were  4.981  mil- 
lion  AFDC  beneficiaries  (U.S.  House  of  Representatives  1994).  In  addi- 
tion  to  benefit  costs,  total  administrative  costs  for  AFDC  were  $3  billion 
(U.S.  House  of  Representatives  1994).  The  Congressional  Budget  Office 
(CBO)  estimates  that  in  1994  AFDC  benefits  will  total  $23  billion 
(Congressional  Budget  Office  1994). 
Originally  titled  Aid  to  Dependent  Children  (ADC),  the  program  dates 
back  to  the  Social  Security  Act  of  1935,  which  created  both  a  pension 
plan  for  the  elderly  and  a  public  assistance  program  for  dependent  chil- 
dren.  The  pension  plan  was  to  operate  as  an  insurance  system  in  which 
individuals  would  receive  benefits  commensurate  with  payments  into  the 
system.  Public  assistance  was  intended  for  widows  with  children  and 
operated  as  a  public  charity.  The  establishment  of  this  dual  operating  sys- 
tem  was  based  on  conceptions  of  fairness  and  the  social  mores  of  the 
time.  Social  Security  beneficiaries  were  thought  to  be  “entitled”  to  bene- 
fits  by  virtue  of  having  made  payments  into  the  fund.  Public  assistance 
was  specifically  for  children.  Predicated  on  the  assumption  that  families 
with  fathers  had  no  need  for  assistance  because  the  fathers  would  support 
the  children,  public  assistance  benefits  were  designed  to  aid  families  in 
which  the  father  was  no  longer  present  (Weir,  Orloff,  and  Skocpol  1988). 
However,  the  depression  of  the  1930s  undermined  the  assumption  that 
living  fathers  would  be  able  to  work  and  support  their  children.  One  way 
in  which  the  New  Deal  sought  to  address  the  problem  of  wide-scale 
unemployment  was  by  creating  public  works  programs.  The  public  works 
were  to  furnish  able-bodied  men  with  work  in  an  economy  in  which  jobs 
were  scarce  and  thereby  enable  them  to  fulfill  their  traditional  role  as 
providers. 
Public  works  programs  were  based  on  the  belief  that  by  working  in 
exchange  for  their  relief,  men  would  be  able  to  maintain  their  moral 
integrity  and  self-esteem,  which  would  be  lost  or  impaired  if  they  had  to 
accept  public  assistance.  Consequently,  the  moral  fabric  of  society  would 
not  be  undermined.  Nor  would  it  be  undermined  by  women’s  staying 
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home  with  their  children,  as  that  was  precisely  what  society  thought 
women  were  supposed  to  do.  Hence  the  initial  welfare  state  was  not 
designed  to  encourage  women  with  children  to  work,  but  rather  to  allow 
them  to  stay  home.  In  fact,  the  system  was  structured  so  that  women  on 
ADC  found  it  difficult  to  “marry  OP  of  welfare.  “Man&r-house”  rules 
effectively  discontinued  benefits  to  any  woman  who  either  had  or  was 
presumed  to  have  a  man  in  the  house.  Moreover,  it  was  a  common 
assumption  that  mothers  who  were  courting  were  neglecting  their  respon- 
sibilities  to  their  children.  Even  though  widows  were  considered  “deserv- 
ing”  recipients,  they  were  not  above  moral  suspicion  (Gordon  1994). 
Food  Stamps 
The  food  stamp  program  is  designed  principally  to  increase  the  food  pure 
chasing  power  of  eligible  low-income  households  so  that  they  can  buy  a 
nutritionally  adequate,  low-cost  diet.  Food  stamp  benefits  are  equivalent 
to  the  difference  between  the  amount  judged  to  be  sufficient  to  buy  an 
adequate,  low-cost  diet  and  a  household’s  expected  contribution  to  its 
food  costs.  The  CBO  estimates  that  more  than  $24  billion  in  food  stamp 
benefits  were  paid  in  FY  1994;  in  an  average  month,  benefits  were  paid 
to  an  estimated  27  million  recipients  (Congressional  Budget  Gffice 
1994). 
The  food  stamp  program,  administered  by  the  U.S.  Department  of 
Agriculture,  dates  back  to  the  early  1970s.  Because  food  stamp  benefit 
rates  are  based  on  a  household’s  income  and  resource  levels  including 
AFDC  benefits,  households  in  states  with  lower  AFDC  benefit  rates 
receive  more  food  stamp  benefits  than  households  in  states  with  higher 
AFDC  benefit  rates.  The  food  stamp  program  therefore  has  had  the  effect 
of  equalizing  some  of  the  state-to-state  disparities  in  AFDC  benefit  levels. 
Medicaid 
Medicaid,  authorized  under  Title  XIX  of  the  Social  Security  Act,  is  an 
entitlement  program  providing  medical  assistance  to  individuals  or  fami- 
lies  with  incomes  under  $9,000  who  are  “aged,  blind,  disabled,  members 
of  families  with  dependent  children,  and  certain  other  pregnant  women 
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and  children”  (U.S.  House  of  Representatives  1994,  783).  The  program 
is  funded  by  federal  funds  that  are  matched  at  a  set  rate  by  state  funds. 
Recent  Reforms  of  Welfare  Programs 
As  demographics  and  our  assumptions  about  who  can  or  should  work 
have  changed,  a  greater  emphasis  has  been  placed  on  the  need  to  get 
welfare  mothers-previously  encouraged  to  refrain  from  entering  the 
work  force-to  work.  Over  the  years  AFDC  has  been  amended  several 
times  to  increase  work  incentives,  but  these  incentives  have  often  been 
negligible. 
The  most  significant  welfare  reform  in  recent  years  has  been  the  Family 
Support  Act  (FSA)  of  1988.  In  addition  to  provisions  aimed  at  enforcing 
paternal  child  support,  the  act  provides  for  job  training  through  the  Job 
Opportunities  and  Basic  Skills  (JOBS)  program.  The  1988  act  stipulated 
that  mothers  with  children  receiving  AFDC  benefits  participate  in  train- 
ing  programs  or  risk  losing  their  benefits.  The  goal  of  the  legislation  was 
to  transform  welfare  into  a  transitional  program  aimed  at  helping  an 
increasing  portion  of  AFDC  recipients  get  jobs  and  avoid  long-term 
dependency.  Through  the  JOBS  program,  states  are  supposed  to  (1)  pro- 
vide  a  broad  range  of  educational,  training,  and  employment-related 
activities,  (2)  increase  the  number  of  AFDC  recipients  participating  in 
these  activities,  and  (3)  target  resources  to  long-term  and  potentially 
long-term  recipients. 
The  FSA  did  recognize  that  states  might  not  be  able  to  serve  all  who 
were  required  to  participate.  To  ensure  satisfactory  participation  in 
JOBS,  the  act  therefore  established  minimum  participation  standards 
that  attempted  to  go  beyond  including  all  AFDC  beneficiaries  in  the 
participant  base  to  including  only  those  who  would  be  required  to  parti- 
cipate  in  JOBS  in  the  base.  The  minimum  participation  standards  rose 
from  7  percent  of  all  participants  in  N  1991  to  20  percent  of  all  partici- 
pants  in  N  1993.  But  due  to  exemptions,  relatively  low  minimum  par- 
ticipation  standards,  and  the  growth  of  the  AFDC  caseload,  the  share  of 
AFDC  recipients  active  in  JOBS  remains  limited  and  has  not  increased 
(U.S.  General  Accounting  Office  1994a).  The  General  Accounting 
Office  (GAO)  also  found  that  from  N  1991  through  N  1993,  in  an 
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more  than  4  million  parents  receiving  AFDC.  The  GAO  concluded  that 
the  current  JOBS  program  has  not  served  a  large  portion  of  the  AFDC 
caseload  and  is  not  well-focused  on  employment  (U.S.  General 
Accounting  Gffice  1994a). 
Interaction  of  AFDC,  Food  Stamp,  and  Medicaid  Programs 
AFDC  recipients  usually  qualify  for  food  stamps  and  Medicaid.  And, 
usually,  the  total  value  of  the  benefit  package  is  greater  than  the  value  of 
the  package  would  be  if  an  individual  worked  full  time  at  the  minimum 
wage.  Although  a  family  supported  by  wages  at  or  near  the  minimum 
wage  will  still  qualify  for  some  AFDC,  food  stamps,  and  Medicaid  (the 
last  so  long  as  earned  income  is  at  or  helow  $9,000),  the  family  may  not 
have  much  more  disposable  income  than  it  would  if  it  had  no  earned 
income,  because  for  every  dollar  of  earned  income  over  $30  per  month 
there  is  a  corresponding  reduction  of  AFDC  benefits.  The  way  the  sys- 
tem  is  currently  designed,  then,  provides  little  incentive  to  work. 
Earned  Income  Tax  Credit 
The  earned  income  tax  credit  is  a  refundable  tax  credit  available  to 
working  households  with  a  qualifying  child  (defined  as  a  dependent 
child  under  the  age  of  18),  The  goal  of  the  credit  is  to  increase  the 
incentive  to  work  by  offering  a  tax  credit  to  offset  the  cost  of  federal  pay. 
roll  taxes.  The  credit  is  refundable  in  that  claimants  can  receive  a  check 
for  the  amount  of  the  credit  that  exceeds  their  federal  tax  liability.  The 
EITC  therefore  acts  as  a  government  subsidy  of  low-wage  labor. 
Because  the  credit  is  completely  dependent  on  family  income,  not  indie 
vidual  circumstances,  the  EITC  is  unlike  a  negative  income  tax  or  some 
other  type  of  minimum  income  floor.  In  order  to  receive  the  credit,  one 
must  work  and  must  file  a  tax  return.  What  distinguishes  the  EITC  from 
other  tradirional  welfare  transfer  payment  programs  is  that  it  is  depen- 
dent  on  both  the  number  of  qualifying  children  in  a  family  and  the 
family’s  amount  of  earned  income. 
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The  Office  of  Management  and  Budget  (OMB)  estimates  that  the  EITC 
will  cost  close  to  $16  billion  by  1995;  some  estimates  place  the  figure 
at  around  $22  billion  (Office  of  Management  and  Budget  1994).  The 
Joint  Committee  on  Taxation  (1994)  estimates  that  in  1996  (when  the 
expansion  of  the  credit  legislated  under  OBRA  1993  is  fully  implement- 
ed)  the  maximum  credit  will  equal  $3,370  for  a  family  with  two  eligible 
children,  $2,040  for  families  with  one  eligible  child,  and  $382.50  for 
those  with  no  children;  the  total  cost  is  estimated  at  $24.5  billion.  So 
although  the  EITC  does  not  entail  spending  in  terms  of  actual  outlays,  it 
is  nonetheless  a  social  maintenance  program  because  it  involves  the 
expenditure  of  tax  revenues.  In  this  regard,  it  is  no  different  from  any 
other  social  program  and  thus  warrants  the  same  type  of  scrutiny  as  do 
others. 
Introduced  in  I975  as  a  means  of  offsetting  the  Social  Security  payroll 
tax,  the  EITC  has  come  to  be  viewed  by  observers  all  along  the  political 
spectrum  as  one  of  the  better  mechanisms  for  assisting  the  poor.  Because 
it  is  refundable  and  is  tied  to  work,  it  is  a  means  of  assisting  those  who 
work.  Consistent  with  the  view  that  the  nonworking  poor  need  to  be 
motivated  to  work,  the  expansion  of  EITC  under  OBRA  199.3,  in  addi- 
tion  to  offering  assistance  to  the  working  poor,  was  designed  to  assist  in 
overall  welfare  reform. 
Operation  of  the  EITC 
The  EITC  is  calculated  in  three  income  ranges:  the  phase-in  range,  the 
stationary  range,  and  the  phase-out  range  (see  Figure  1).  In  1996  (when 
the  expansion  under  OBRA  1993  is  fully  implemented),  families  with 
two  or  more  children  will  be  ehgible  to  receive  a  credit  equal  to  40  per- 
cent  of  the  first  $8,425  of  earned  income;  for  those  with  only  one  child, 
the  credit  equals  34  percent  of  the  first  $6,000  dollars  of  earned  income. 
For  a  family  of  two  or  more  children  with  income  between  $8,425  and 
$11,000  (or  between  $6,000  and  $11,000  for  a  family  with  one  child), 
the  credit  remains  constant  at  the  maximum  credit  level  (hence,  the 
term  stationary  for  this  income  range).  The  maximum  credit  will  be 
$3,370  for  a  family  with  two  eligible  children  and  $2,040  for  a  family 
with  one  child.  For  incomes  above  those  in  the  stationary  range,  the 
EITC  gradually  declines.  For  a  family  with  two  or  more  children,  the 
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based  on  earnings  of  a  family  with  two  or  more  children. 
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credit  decreases  by  21.06  percent  for  every  dollar  of  earned  income 
above  $11,000;  for  a  family  with  one  child  it  declines  by  15.98  percent 
for  earned  income  above  the  stationary  range.  The  Congressional  Budget 
Office  has  estimated  the  maximum  credit,  when  indexed  to  inflation,  at 
$3,560  for  taxpayers  with  adjusted  gross  incomes  of  up  to  about  $11,600 
(Congressional  Budget  Office  1994). 
For  example,  a  family  with  two  children  and  with  earnings  of  $10,000 
(in  the  stationary  income  range)  will  receive  the  maximum  credit  of 
$3,370.  A  family  with  two  children  and  with  earnings  of  $17,000  (in  the 
phase-out  income  range),  will  receive  much  less.  This  family’s  credit  will 
be  equal  to  the  maximum  credit  of  $3,370  minus  21.06  percent  of  the 
difference  between  its  income  and  earnings  at  the  end  of  the  stationary 
range.  Therefore,  a  family  income  of  $17,000  would  receive  a  credit  of 
$2,106.’ 
Recipients  can  receive  their  credit  in  one  lump  sum  paid  upon  filing 
their  annual  tax  return,  or  they  can  request  that  their  employers  disburse 
the  credit  in  advance  through  regular  payroll  checks.  To  receive  the 
credit  in  advance,  employees  must  fill  out  forms  that  allow  their  employ. 
ers  to  pay  them  their  credit  over  the  course  of  the  year,  with  employers 
reimbursed  at  the  end  of  the  year.  The  advance  payment  option  is  not 
widely  familiar  to  either  employers  or  eligible  employees.  The  GAO  esti- 
mated  that  less  than  0.5  percent  of  those  who  received  the  EITC  in  1989 
received  it  in  advance  through  the  payroll  option  (U.S.  General 
Accounting  Office  1992).  In  a  survey  of  617  employers,  the  GAO  found 
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that  60  percent  did  not  know  about  either  the  credit  or  the  advance  pay- 
ment  option.  Although  the  IRS,  through  its  outreach  efforts,  did  publi- 
cize  the  credit,  it  did  little  to  promote  the  advance  payment  option. 
President  Clinton  attempted  to  publicize  the  option  by  instructing  fed- 
eral  agencies  and  departments  to  inform  all  federal  employees  who  would 
qualify  for  the  credit  of  the  advance  payment  feature. 
Problems  with  the  EITC 
Despite  its  popularity,  there  are  some  problems  with  the  EITC.  Because 
the  EITC  requires  filing  a  tax  return,  many  people  who  are  eligible  for 
the  credit  may  not  receive  it.  Many  families  who  earn  too  little  to  pay 
taxes  do  not  file  returns  and,  hence,  do  not  receive  the  credit  that  they 
are  otherwise  entitled  to.  Based  on  data  from  the  Survey  of  Income  and 
Program  Participation  (SIPP)  and  fr om  special  tabulations  on  files  con- 
taining  tax  return  data  provided  by  the  U.S.  Census  Bureau,  Scholz 
(1994)  estimated  that  in  1990  only  80  to  86  percent  of  eligible  credit 
recipients  filed  for  the  credit.  This  means  that  about  2.1  million  eligible 
taxpayers  failed  to  receive  the  credit. 
At  the  same  time,  many  file  for  and  receive  the  EITC  who  are  ineligible 
on  the  basis  of  total  income.  The  EITC  is  based  solely  on  eurned  income 
(wages,  tips,  and  salaries).  A  family  can  have  substantial  investment 
income  (such  as  income  from  dividends,  capital  gains,  or  interest),  but 
little  earned  income  and  thus  still  qualify  for  the  credit.  For  instance,  a 
Emily  with  a  total  income  of  $30,000  could  conceivably  qualify  for  the 
EITC  if  at  least  $3,000  of  the  total  was  investment  income.*  Based  on 
the  IRS’s  Individual  Statistics  of  Income  database,  O’Neal  and 
Nelsestuen  (1994)  found  that  approximately  10  percent  of  the  EITC 
benefits  paid  in  1988  went  to  households  with  substantial  accumulations 
of  investment  assets.  One  extreme  example  was  a  recipient  who  had 
portfolio  income  consisting  of  interest  and  dividends  in  excess  of 
$299,000. 
Further,  as  the  EITC  is  currently  structured,  the  bulk  of  claimed  benefits 
go  to  families  with  earned  incomes  in  the  phase-out  range.  Based  on 
adjusted  gross  income  data  from  the  Internal  Revenue  Service,  in  1991 
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only  about  5  percent  of  EITC  returns  had  incomes  that  fell  in  the  phase- 
in  range,  but  more  than  50  percent  had  incomes  that  fell  in  the  phase- 
out  range  (see  Table  1).  Holtzblatt,  McCubbin,  and  Gillette  (1994)  Cal* 
culated  that  prior  to  OBRA  1993  4.1  million  (28  percent)  of  all  EITC 
claimants  had  incomes  in  the  phase-in  range,  2.8  million  (19  percent) 
had  incomes  in  the  stationary  range,  and  7.6  million  (53  percent)  had 
incomes  in  the  phaseeout  range,  As  a  consequence  of  OBRA  1993,  in 
1994  the  number  of  households  with  incomes  in  the  phase-in  and  sta- 
tionary  ranges  declined,  and  the  number  in  the  phase-out  increased;  3.5 
million  (22  percent)  of  claimants  had  incomes  in  the  phase-in  range,  2.5 
million  (16  percent)  in  the  stationary  range,  and  9.8  million  (62  per- 
cent)  in  the  phase-out  range.  Similarly,  Hoffman  and  Seidman  (1990) 
found  that  the  typical  EITC  family  had  low-to-moderate  income,  placing 
it  above  the  poverty  line.  Although  74  percent  had  incomes  below 
$15,000  (in  1988  dollam),  approximately  11  percent  had  incomes  above 
$20,000,  and  some  had  incomes  above  $30,000. 
Gn  the  whole,  then,  the  EITC  appears  to  be  providing  benefits  primarily 
to  lower-middle-class  families  who,  although  they  are  not  much  above 
the  poverty  line,  would  not  be  considered  poor  by  official  definitions. 
This  is  precisely  the  group  excluded  from  most  income  transfer  programs. 
The  majority  of  families  claiming  the  credit  were  single-parent  families, 
of  which  80  percent  had  a  female  as  the  head  of  household.  More  than 
80  percent  of  claimants  had  only  one  or  two  children.  Almost  60  per- 
cent  of  EITC  recipients  worked  at  least  1,500  hours  a  year,  and  almost 
25  percent  reported  working  more  than  2,080  hours  (Hoffman  and 
Seidman  1990).3 
If  the  majority  of  EITC  recipients  fall  in  the  phase-out  range,  some  of 
the  intended  purpose  behind  the  expansion  is  called  into  question.  The 
bulk  of  the  total  dollar  value  of  EITC  benefits  is  claimed  by  those  who 
are  not  covered  by  current  welfare  programs.  The  poorest  members 
of  society  (those  earning  between  $0  and  $11,000)  do  not  benefit  much 
from  the  EITC.  And  yet,  this  is  the  income  range  that  welfare  recipi- 
ents  would  presumably  be  earning  if  they  were  to  work.  The  problem 
with  the  EITC  as  a  tool  of  welfare  reform  is  that  those  whom  the  credit 
should  be  targeting  are  precisely  those  who  derive  no  real  benefit 
from  it. 
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Table  1  Distribution  of  EITC  Returns,  by  Income  Level 
Income  Range 
EITC  Returns  Value  of  Credit  Average 
Number  Percent  (in  thousands)  Credit 
$S,OOo-10,000  332,636  5  $32,853  $98.76 
$lO,OOO-15,000  2,079,143  31  754,474  362.87 
$15,000-20,000  3,056,909  50  1,238,448  405*13 
$20,000-25,000  706,628  11  58,323  82.54 
Note:  Figures represent  the  EITC  as  it  was used to  ofket  taxes  before  the  credit. 
Sotme:  Internal  Revenue  !%vice,  Srarkti  of buome-1991,  huh&d  hcome  Tax  i7etunw, 
(Washington,  DC.:  IRS,  1994). 
Interaction  of  EITC  with  Welfare  Programs 
According  to  the  Survey  of  Income  and  Program  Participation  (SIPI’),  in 
1988  an  average  27  million  individuals  collected  AFDC  and  other  cash 
assistance  each  month  (Bureau  of  the  Census  1990).  Those  who  qualify 
for  AFDC  and  food  stamps  and  also  work  qualify  for  the  EITC,  earning 
incomes  that  fall  primarily  in  the  credit’s  phase-in  and  stationary  ranges. 
Although  some  of  the  4.981  million  AFDC  families  are  working  and 
could  be  receiving  some  EITC  benefits,  most  do  not  work  and  therefore 
cannot  claim  the  credit.  The  question  to  be  answered  is  how  does  the 
overall  structure  of  existing  welfare  programs  prevent  those  on  welfare 
from  moving  to  work  and  thereby  deriving  the  full  benefit  of  the  EITC. 
For  families  whose  incomes  fall  in  the  phase-in  and  stationary  ranges, 
the  effect  of  the  EITC  is  to  raise  wages  by  as  much  as  40  percent.  Since 
this  is  also  the  range  of  income  received  for  working  at  a  full-time  job  for 
a  salary  at  or  near  the  minimum  wage,  it  is  presumably  the  same  income 
range  that  those  who  are  currently  receiving  AFDC  benefits  would  be  in 
were  they  to  work  and  file  for  the  credit.  Because  the  EITC  increases  the 
rewards  to  work,  the  expansion  of  the  credit  legislated  in  OBRA  1993 
should  present  a  greater  incentive  to  work. 
The  stated  purpose  of  the  EITC’s  expansion  was  to  lift  the  incomes  of 
poor  working  families  above  the  poverty  line.  It  would  seem,  then,  that 
families  who  should  receive  the  maximum  credit  are  those  earning 
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incomes  in  the  phase-in  range,  as  they  are  the  ones  whose  effective  earn- 
ings  the  expansion  was  meant  to  target. 
For  example,  consider  a  single  parent  who  has  two  children  and  works 
f&time  at  the  minimum  wage.  In  1996,  when  the  EITC  is  fully  imple- 
mented,  the  family’s  annual  earnings  would  be  $8,840  ($4.25  per  hour  x 
40  hours  per  week  x  52  weeks  per  year);  the  addition  of  the  maximum 
credit  of  $3,370  effectively  raises  this  family’s  annual  income  to  $12,210 
(or  $5.87  per  hour).  C  ontrary  to  those  who  argue  that  the  current  wel- 
fare  system  encourages  people  to  stay  home  and  collect  benefits  (see,  for 
example,  Kaplan  and  Tausky  1972,  Banfield  1974,  Auletta  1982,  Murray 
1984,  Mead  1986,  and  Freeman  and  Holzer  1986),  the  EITC  would 
appear  to  provide  the  right  incentive  to  work  (see,  for  example,  Ellwood 
1988).  Yet  evidence  seems  to  suggest  otherwise. 
Consider  the  example  of  a  mother  of  two  children  who  lives  in 
Pennsylvania  and  has  worked  four  months  on  a  job.  The  economic 
trade-off  between  work  and  welfare  for  this  mother  is  prmented  in  Table 
2.  As  the  data  show,  as  the  mother  works  more  hours  (or  as  her  wage 
rises)  and  she  moves  up  the  income  ladder  through  the  phase-in  and  sta- 
tionary  ranges  of  the  EITC,  her  AFDC  benefits  decline.  In  addition,  the 
value  of  the  EITC  is  completely  absorbed  by  work  expenses  such  as  child 
care.  When  her  income  reaches  $9,OCQ  combined  Social  Security  and 
work  expenses  exceed  the  EITC. 
InitialIy,  then,  there  might  be  an  incentive  for  this  mother  to  work  part- 
time  and  earn  $2,000  a  year  for  a  gain  in  total  disposable  income  of 
$1,375  (or  $688  per  $1,000  of  earnings).  But  the  net  gain  from  earning 
an  additional  $2,000  (rhe  difference  between  earning  $2,000  and  $4,000) 
will  be  only  $367  (or  $184  for  each  additional  $1,000  of  earnings).  The 
marginal  benefit  of  working  for  each  additional  $1,000  of  earnings  is  only 
about  $184  until  earnings  reach  $7,000.  When  earnings  rise  to  $8,000, 
the  marginal  benefit  drops  to  $116.  When  earnings  increase  to  $9,000, 
the  marginal  benefit  of  working  rises  to  $567.  When  earnings  reach 
$10,000,  the  marginal  benefit  of  working  drops  again,  to  $414. 
Still,  at  an  income  level  of  $10,000  this  mother  clearly  has  a  greater  dis- 
posable  income  than  she  would  have  if  she  were  not  working  at  all.  At 
the  same  time,  however,  she  no  longer  is  eligible  for  Medicaid  benefits.  If 
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the  value  of  Medicaid-in  PennsyIvania  estimated  to  average  $4,128 
($1,810  for  an  adult  and  $1,159  for  each  child&were  included  as  an 
expense,  the  working  mother  earning  $10,000  would  find  herself  consid- 
erably  worse  off  than  the  nonworking  mother  (see  Table  3).  If  we  sub- 
tract  the  value  of  Medicaid  benefits  from  the  previous  calculation  of  dis- 
posable  income  ($10,937),  her  new  level  of  disposable  income  would 
total  $6,809,  $739  less  than  the  level  of  benefits  (excluding  Medicaid) 
received  by  a  nonworking  mother.4 
Hence,  given  the  current  structure  of  the  welfare-EITC  package,  work 
incentives  appear  to  exist  for  earnings  at  or  below  $9,000.  The  marginal 
benefit  of  $414  for  earning  an  additional  $1,000  is  by  no  means  suffi- 
cient  to  offset  the  cost  of  purchasing  health  insurance  on  the  private 
market.  No  one  knows  exactly  what  it  would  cost  to  purchase  a  bare- 
bones  policy,  but  even  if  a  bare-bones  policy  could  be  obtained  for  half 
the  value  of  average  Medicaid  benefits  ($2,064),  the  working  mother  in 
rhis  example  would  have  a  disposable  income  of  only  $8,873,  which  still 
would  be  less  than  the  disposable  income  of  a  mother  in  similar  circum- 
stances  who  earned  only  $2,000.  UnIess  an  employer  were  to  provide 
health  insurance,  working  may  actually  be  a  more  costly  option  than  not 
working.  Even  though  in  terms  of  absolute  income  level  the  worker 
earning  $2,000  h as  more  “income”  than  the  nonworker,  it  is  clear  that  a 
worker  is  not  necessarily  better  off  than  a  nonworker.  On  the  contrary, 
once  earnings  exceed  $9,000  and  a  working  mother  loses  her  Medicaid, 
she  may  be  much  worse  off  than  a  nonworker. 
On  the  face  of  it,  then,  it  appears  that  Medicaid  is  the  aggravating  vari- 
able.  But  such  an  appraisal  is  too  simplistic,  because  Medicaid  varies 
with  place  and  is  an  intangible,  noncash  benefit.  In  this  example,  the 
value  of  Medicaid  could  clearly  alter  the  decision  about  whether  to  for- 
sake  welfare  for  work.  However,  in  another  state  Medicaid  could  easily 
be  half  the  amount  and  therefore  a  much  less  important  factor  in  wel- 
fare-to-work  decisions.  In  addition,  a  welfare  recipient  might  not  see  any 
benefit  in  working  if  the  difference  between  not  working  and  working  is 
that  one  receives  Medicaid  in  the  former  case  and  does  not  in  the  latter. 
To  a  large  extent,  Medicaid  acts  much  like  a  dummy,  or  qualitative,  vari- 
able  and,  as  such,  cannot  be  as  easily  quantified  as  the  other  assistance 
programs.5  Blank  (1989)  has  noted  that  the  actual  (dollar)  value  of 
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Medicaid  benefits  has  little  effect  on  AFDC  participation.  This  is  not 
the  same  as  saying  that  because  Medicaid  is  available  only  to  AFDC  par- 
ticipants,  Medicaid  will  not  have  an  impact  on  the  decision  about 
whether  to  work  in  the  minimum-wage  market  or  simply  participate  in 
AFDC.  Rather,  the  meaningful  factor  is  the  availability  of  affordable 
health  care.  In  other  words,  the  value  of  the  program  may  be  of  no  con- 
sequence,  but  the  program  in  and  of  itself  is  (Bane  and  Ellwood  1994). 
This  conclusion  is  supported  by  Moffitt  and  Wolfe  (1992),  who  found 
that  if  100  percent  of  workers  received  medical  coverage,  AFDC  partici- 
pation  would  fall  by  7.3  percent  and  the  employment  rate  would  rise  by 
16  percent;  medical  coverage  would  actually  reduce  the  AFDC  caseload 
by  20  percent.  The  effect  of  Medicaid  on  the  welfare-to-work  decision 
cannot,  therefore,  be  dismissed.  The  choice  facing  AFDC  recipients  is 
no  longer  whether  there  is  a  positive  incentive  to  work,  but  whether 
they  can  afford  to  work  given  that  Medicaid  benefits  are  lost  once  earn 
ings  exceed  $9,000.  Unless  an  employer  provides  health  insurance,  there 
is  an  effective  marginal  tax  on  the  worker,  the  size  of  which  is  contin- 
gent  on  what  it  would  cost  to  purchase  insurance  in  the  private  market- 
place. 
Although  the  combination  of  welfare  benefits  and  the  EITC  does  not 
appear  to  provide  an  AFDC  recipient  much  incentive  to  leave  welfare 
for  full-time,  minimum-wage  employment,  she  would  indeed  be  worse  off 
if  she  did  work  and  there  was  no  EITC.  Consider  again  the  working 
mother  living  in  Pennsylvania  with  two  children.  Without  the  EITC  it 
makes  sense  for  her  to  work  only  if  she  earns  $2,000  (see  Table  4). 
Earnings  between  $2,001  and  $8,000  are  associated  with  negative  mar- 
ginal  benefits  and  falling  disposable  income.  Although  marginal  benefits 
are  positive  for  earnings  over  $8,000,  the  mother  who  works  full  time  at 
the  minimum  wage  (and  therefore  earns  between  $8,000  and  $9,000  per 
year)  would  realize  roughly  the  same  amount  of  disposable  income  as  if 
she  were  not  working  at  all. 
Even  though  comparing  the  world  with  the  EITC  to  the  world  without  it 
(Table  2  compared  to  Table  4)  shows  that  a  mother  earning  the  mini- 
mum  wage  would  have  more  disposable  income  with  the  EITC  than 
without  it,  the  EITC  still  does  not  make  our  working  mother  much  bet- 
ter  off  than  if  she  were  not  workiig  at  all.  And  any  incentive  that  she 
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might  have  to  work  is  likely  to  be  muted  by  the  fact  that  if  her  earnings 
are  slightly  higher  than  the  minimum  wage  (that  is,  more  rhan  $9,000), 
she  will  lose  her  Medicaid  assistance. 
The  extent  to  which  the  current  EITCwelfare  package  is  able  to 
provide  incentives  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  no  one  knows  how 
many  people  who  enter  the  low-wage  labor  market  will  be  lucky  enough 
to  find  jobs  providing  health  insurance  benefits.  Nor  does  anyone  know 
how  many  of  those  iho  obtain  employment  but  do  not  receive  health 
insurance  benefits  will  still  be  able  to  obtain  medical  care  at  afford- 
able  prices. 
Another  major  obstacle  to  working  for  the  poor  and  the  near-poor  is 
child  care,  so  far  only  alluded  to  in  the  above  example’s  computation  of 
disposable  income  (as  a  portion  of  “work  expenses”).  The  cost  of  child 
care  alone  will  affect  women’s  decisions  about  entering  the  labor  market 
(Connelly  1992).  According  to  the  GAO,  the  provision  of  a  fir11 subsidy 
to  mothers  who  must  pay  for  child  care  could  increase  the  proportion  of 
poor  mothers  who  work  by  15  percentage  points,  from  the  current  rate  of 
29  percent  to  44  percent,  and  the  proportion  of  near-poor  mothers  who 
work  by  14  percentage  points,  from  the  current  rate  of  43  percent  to  57 
percent  (U.S.  General  Accounting  Ofice  1994b).  Such  a  subsidy  would 
increase  the  proportion  of  nonpoor  mothers  who  work  by  10  percentage 
points,  from  the  current  rate  of  55  percent  to  65  percent.  The  findings  of 
the  GAO  study  appear  consistent  with  those  of  Berger  and  Black  (1992). 
who  estimated  that  subsidized  child  care  programs  would  lead  to  a  12 
percent  increase  in  employment.  These  results  suggest  that  among  the 
factors  encouraging  low-income  mothers  to  seek  and  keep  jobs,  afford- 
able  child  care  is  a  decisive  one.  And  because  most  mothers  do  pay  for 
child  care  while  they  work,  their  decision  to  enter  the  work  force  is 
therefore  contingent  on  how  much  income  they  have  after  child  care 
expenses  have  been  paid.  Admittedly,  considering  cost  factors  alone  may 
miss  the  complexities  involved  in  child  care.  While  such  complexities 
may  not  be  quantifiable,  they  still  are  likely  to  enter  into  a  mother’s  deter- 
mination  of  whether  to  work  or  to  continue  receiving  welfare  beneftts. 
Analyzing  the  welfare-to-work  decision  is  made  even  more  complicated 
by  the  fact  that  under  existing  programs  states  (or  localities)  set  benefit 
levels.  Variations  across  regional  and  state  boundaries  mean  that  the 
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EITC  (as  currently  structured)  offers  greater  incentives  to  work  in  states 
in  which  AFDC  benefits  are  considerably  less  generous.  (The  appendix 
provides  an  example  of  how  variations  in  benefit  lcvcls  across  states 
might  affect  incentives  to  work.) 
Given  the  variety  of  factors  affecting  the  decision  to  work,  it  seems  clear 
that,  even  at  its  projected  1996  level,  the  EITC  alone  cannot  motivate 
those  on  welfare  to  go  to  work.  Even  though  it  offers  relief,  the  credit  is 
simply  insufficient  to  provide  an  adequate  income  to  mothers  who  may 
consider  leaving  welfare.  Given  the  wages  that  most  mothers  who  lcdve 
welfare  would  receive,  the  size  of  the  credit  in  most  cases  would  cover 
only  the  cost  of  child  care.  In  a  sense,  the  credit’s  only  effect  may  be  to 
lift  the  living  standards  of  working  mothers  to  levels  comparable  to  those 
of  welfare  mothers;  without  the  credit  a  working  mother  earning  the 
minimum  wage  would  clearly  be  worse  off.  Moreover,  if  a  welfare  recipi- 
ent  is  faced  with  a  low-skill  labor  market  in  which  there  is  no  dignity 
associated  with  work,  there  is  really  no  incentive  to  work. 
lmpkations  for  Welfare  Reform 
What  is  important  to  stress  is  that  while  welfare  recipients  who  work  are 
eligible  for  the  EITC,  the  interaction  between  weIfare  programs  and  the 
credit  ultimately  leads  to  a  situation  where  there  is  not  much  incentive 
to  work,  Yet,  these  recipients  are  the  very  people  who  should  be  targeted 
by  the  EITC  as  part  of  any  welfare  reform  effort.  It  is  clear  that  work 
incentives  need  to  be  stronger  than  they  are  under  the  current  structure 
of  welfare  programs  and  the  EITC.  The  current  structure  appears  to  pro- 
vide  an  incentive  to  work  only  if  incentive  is  measured  in  terms  of 
absolute  income.  Greater  absolute  income,  however,  does  not  necessarily 
make  a  person  better  off  (Bane  and  Ellwood  1994). 
It  would  seem,  then,  that  serious  welfare  reform  requires  more  than  just 
the  addition  of  the  EITC-even  an  expanded  one-to  the  current  array 
of  welfare  programs.  An  expanded  EITC  might  enhance  work  incen- 
tives,  but  not  enough  to  entice  significant  numbers  to  leave  the  welfare 
rolls.  First,  an  expanded  EITC  may  not  be  correctly  structured  to  reach 
the  correct  targets  to  achieve  that  goal.  Second,  the  value  of  the  credit 
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Table  5  Demographics  of  the  1992  AFDC  Population 
Average  family  size  (persons)  2.9 











Basis  for  eligibility  (percent  of  child  recipients) 
Parents  prcscnt  in  household 
Parent  incdpdcitated 
Parent  unemployed 
Parents  absent  from  household 
Death 
Divorce  or  separation 
No  marital  tie 
Other  reason 
Unknown 
Age  of  mother  (percent  of  mothers) 
Under  20  yeam 
20  to  24  years 
25  to  29  years 
30  to  39  years 
40  years  or  older 
Unknown 
Age  of  children  (percent  of  recipient  children) 
Under  3  years 
3  to  5  years 
6  to  11  years 
12  yexs  and  older 
Unknown 




Native  American 
Asian 

























(Gmtitwed  on  next  puge) 
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Education  of  mother  (percent  of  mothers) 
Eighth  grade  or  less 
One  to  three  years  of  high  school 
High  school  diploma 
Some  college 








Mother’s  employment  status  (percent  of  mothers) 
Full-time  job 
Part-time  job 
Presence  of  income  (percent  families) 
With  earnings 





Father’s  relationship  to  youngest  child  (percent  of  fathers) 
No  father 
Natural  father 
Adoptive  father 
Stepfather 
Other  factors  (percent  of  households) 
Living  in  public  housing 
Participating  in  food  stamp  or  donated  food  program 
Including  nonrecipient  members 








Source:  U.S.  House  of  Representatives,  CJommiwee  on  Ways  and  Means9  Owrview  of 
Encitbenr  Programs:  The  Green  Book,  i994  (Washington,  DC.:  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  1994),  401402. 
(even  when  fully  implemented  in  1996)  appears  to  be  too  low  to  make 
any  significant  difference  in  the  decision  to  leave  welfare  for  work. 
The  problem,  however,  is  not  the  presence  of  the  EITC,  but  the  structure 
of  the  other  programs.  The  question  that  perhaps  should  be  addressed  is 
what  prevents  AFDC  recipients  from  entering  the  work  force.  That  is, 
assuming  that  jobs  exist  (which  is  another  issue  altogether),  why  is  this 
population  unable  to  take  advantage  of  work  opportunities? 
To  answer  this  question,  it  is  necessary  to  examine  the  composition  of 
the  AFDC  population.  Table  5  provides  basic  demographic  information 
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for  the  AFDC  population  in  1992.  What  stands  out  in  the  data  is  that  a 
considerable  percentage  of  mothers  (44.3  percent)  cared  for  young  chil- 
dren  (under  6  years  of  age)  and  that  many  (at  least  46.1  percent)  had 
only  a  high  school  education  or  less.  With  so  few  years  of  schooling,  it  is 
likely  that  these  women  would  be  able  to  find  only  low-skill  jobs  paying 
no  more  than  minimum  wages.  Moreover,  if  they  were  to  work,  they 
would  have  to  pay  child  care  and  have  to  find  and  pay  for  medical  insur- 
ance.  As  tables  2  and  4  show,  if  a  mother  can  make  only  the  minimum 
wage  and  has  to  incur  child-care  expenses,  she  has  little  incentive  to 
move  off  welfare,  even  given  the  benefit  of  the  EITC. 
Problem  of  Synchronization 
Although  there  would  be  even  less  incentive  to  work  without  the  EITC, 
even  with  the  EITC  there  is  little  incentive  at  the  low  end  of  the  earn- 
ings  distribution  to  move  from  welfare  to  work.  At  the  upper  end  of  the 
distribution  the  credit  may  adversely  affect  labor  incentive  insofar  as  it 
enables  workers  to  trade  off  some  hours  of  work  in  exchange  for  greater 
leisure  time  (Hoffman  and  Seidman  1990,  U.S.  General  Accounting 
Office  1992,  and  Kosters  1993).  If  the  end  result  is  that  more  people  in 
the  phase-out  range  receive  the  credit  than  people  in  the  phase-in  and 
stationary  ranges,  the  EITC  is,  in  effect,  no  more  than  tax  relief  for  the 
lower-middle  class. 
What,  then,  are  the  advantages  of  the  EITC?  In  light  of  the  program’s 
costs,  this  is  by  no  means  a  trivial  question.  If  the  only  goal  of  the  credit 
is  to  reduce  the  poverty  rate,  there  may  be  some  evidence  that  the  EITC 
does  its  job.  The  GAO  estimated  that  the  EITC  reduced  the  poverty 
rate  by  as  much  as  0.7  percent  in  1991,  after  having  reduced  the  rate  by 
a  relatively  smaller  0.1  percent  in  1985  and  0.4  percent  in  1988  (U.S. 
General  Accounting  Office  1992).  According  to  the  Center  on  Budget 
and  Policy  Priorities,  the  effect  of  the  Clinton  expansion  of  the  EITC 
proposal  was  to  reduce  the  number  of  people  in  poverty  by  over  2  mil- 
lion  in  1994.6  (Data  on  the  number  of  families  living  in  poverty  are  pro- 
vided  in  Table  6.) 
However,  adding  the  1993  maximum  credit  for  a  family  of  three  of 
$1,511  to  minimum-wage  yearly  earnings  yields  only  $10,351  in  total 
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Table  6  Families  Living  Below  the  Poverty  Line,  by  Race,  19% 
(in  thousands) 
Family  All  White  Black  Hispanic’ 
Population  68,144  57,858  7,888  5,31a 
Number  in  poverty 
Percent  of  number 
in  poverty 
Percent  of  own  group 
7,960  5,160  2,435  1,395 
100.0  64.8  30.6  17.5 
11.7  8.9  30.9  26.2 
Married-couple  households 
Percent  of  number 
in  poverty 
3,318  2,631  486  680 
41.7  33.1  6.1  8.5 
Female-headed  households 
Percent  of  number 
in  pwerty 
4,171  2,202  1,835  604 
52.4  27.7  23.1  7.6 
L  Those  of  Hispanic  origin  may  be  of  any  race. 
Source:  Bureau  of  the  Census,  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  “Poverty  in  the  United 
States:  1992,”  Current  Popdxxion  Repnrt~,  I’60-185  (Washington,  DC.:  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  1993). 
income,  as  compared  to  the  1993  poverty  line  of  $11,572  ($14,763  for  a 
family  of  four).  Even  with  the  EITC  such  a  family  would  still  have  lived 
below  the  poverty  line,  and  even  with  food  stamps  it  would  not  have 
risen  much  above  the  line.  With  the  expansion  of  the  EITC  under 
OBRA  1993,  a  family  with  earnings  of  $11,368  in  1994  would  still  have 
found  itself  with  less  than  a  poverty-level  income.  Even  though  food 
stamps  would  have  raised  this  family’s  total  income  above  the  poverty 
line,  in  net  terms  (that  is,  in  terms  of  disposable  income)  the  family 
would  still  have  been  living  in  poverty. 
It  may  be  that  our  expectations  of  the  EITC  are  too  high.  As  a  form  of 
tax  relief,  the  credit  does  its  job.  But  many  now  are  viewing  the  EITC  as 
a  staple  of  welfare  reform  which,  in  the  credit’s  current  form,  may  be  too 
much  to  expect  from  it.  Reducing  the  number  of  people  in  poverty  and 
motivating  people  to  go  from  welfare  to  work  are  two  different  matters 
entirely.  If  2  million  people  are  assisted,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  EITC 
has  some  merit.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  because  the  program  is  a  bene- 
fit  to  the  working  poor,  it  will  be  a  good  vehicle  for  motivating  the  poor- 
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est  members  of  society  to  forsake  welfare  for  work.  The  EITC,  then, 
should  be  targeted  at  the  poorest  in  the  market. 
The  first  step  in  targeting  this  population  is  making  employers  and 
potential  employees  aware  that  this  labor  market  subsidy  exists;  many 
potential  beneficiaries  do  not  take  advantage  of  the  credit  because  they 
simply  are  unaware  of  it.  Both  employers  and  employees  must  be  made 
aware  that  eligible  employees  can  receive  the  EITC  through  their  regular 
paychecks  and  that  the  credit  can  be  payable  either  during  the  working 
year  or  as  a  lump  sum  at  the  end  of  the  year.  They  must  also  be  informed 
that  there  are  forms  to  be  filled  out  and  instructed  how  to  do  so,  so  the 
potential  beneficiaries  do  not  fail  to  take  advantage  of  the  credit  because 
of  the  complexity  of  the  forms  (Nelson  1992). 
But  targeting  the  EITC  at  low-wage  workers  raises  serious  questions.  For 
example,  would  widespread  knowledge  and  use  of  the  credit  give 
employers  an  incentive  to  maintain  low  wage  rates?  At  present,  answer- 
ing  this  question  is  almost  impossible.  The  GAO  found  that  60  percent 
of  the  employers  they  surveyed  between  December  1990  and  October 
1991  knew  little  or  nothing  about  the  EITC  (U.S.  General  Accounting 
O&e  1992);  given  this  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  credit,  it  is  hard  to 
make  a  case  that  the  EITC  has  up  to  this  point  kept  wages  artificially 
low.  But  if  the  Clinton  administration  successfully  publicizes  the 
advance  payment  option,  might  employers  find  themselves  armed  with  a 
new  mechanism  for  maintaining  low  wage  rates?  That  is,  if  employers 
know  that  their  employees  are  receiving  higher  effective  wages  as  a  result 
of  the  credit,  would  employers  be  encouraged  to  pay  lower  wages?  The 
question  of  just  who  is  being  subsidized-workers,  employers,  or  both- 
warrants  attention. 
Targeting  also  involves  the  coordination  of  the  EITC  with  other  public 
assistance  programs.  If  there  is  little  incentive  for  an  AFDC  recipient 
to  work  because  she  will  be  penalized  by  the  loss  of  other  benefits,  of 
what  value  is  a  labor  market  subsidy?  It  is  one  thing  to  say  the  EITC  is 
intended  to  assist  the  working  poor  and  possibly  offer  a  small  incentive 
to  move  from  welfare  to  work;  it  is  quite  another  to  show  that  the  credit 
actually  accomplishes  these  objectives. 
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For  the  EITC  to  offer  a  greater  incentive  for  those  on  welfare  to  go  to 
work,  the  program  would  have  to  be  restructured;  that  restructuring 
would  have  to  involve  no  less  than  the  synchronization  of  benefits.  One 
approach  would  be  to  eliminate  the  other  assistance  programs;  if  the 
EITC  were  the  only  assistance  program,  the  poor  would  have  no  choice 
but  to  rely  on  it.  But  this  option  is  essentially  negative,  as  it  would  fail  to 
foster  the  type  of  dignity  work  should  have.  Although  it  is  true  that  sim- 
ply  cutting  the  other  programs  can  make  the  EITC  appear  to  be  a  posi- 
tive  inducement  to  work,  such  reductions  would  in  reality  be  a  form  of 
“tough  love”  (Heclo  1994)  based  on  the  assumptions  that  the  poor  are 
lazy  and  that  they  do  not  work  for  what  Mead  (1992)  calls  “mysterious” 
reasons. 
For  an  elimination  of  benefits  to  succeed,  welfare  mothers  would  have  to 
be  able  to  find  types  of  jobs  that  would  enable  them  to  earn  more  than 
they  are  currently  receiving  through  transfer  programs.  As  the  demo- 
graphics  of  the  AFDC  population  show,  this  is  highly  unlikely  (Burtless 
1994).  Moreover,  the  private  marketplace  would  have  to  be  able  to  gen- 
erate  sufficient  employment  so  that  all  who  want  to  work  can  find  a  job, 
and  it  is  not  entirely  clear  that  sufficient  jobs  exist.  If  there  are  not 
enough  jobs,  the  end  result  would  be  more  suffering  and  misery.7 
Some  believe  that  there  are  enough  low-skill  jobs  for  existing  welfare 
mothers.  For  instance,  Blank  (1995)  has  argued  that  there  is  little  evi- 
dence  that  jobs  per  se  have  become  less  available,  especially  for  lcss- 
skilled  female  workers;  in  fact,  women’s  unemployment  rates  have  fallen 
relative  to  men’s  over  the  past  decade.  Burtless  (1995)  has  observed  that 
despite  the  existence  of  roughly  7  million  jobless  workers,  most  labor 
economists  believe  that  employers  have  the  ability  to  offer  jobs  to  2  to  3 
million  current  AFDC  recipients  if  the  recipients  were  forced  to  leave 
the  welfare  rolls.  Blank  (1995)  also  notes,  however,  that  substantial  evi- 
dence  indicates  that  the  attributes  of  available  jobs  have  deteriorated.  So 
while  the  U.S.  labor  market  has  changed  since  the  early  197Os,  these 
changes  have  not  led  to  the  elimination  of  jobs  for  less-skilled  workers, 
but  rather  to  a  reconfiguraGon  of  those  jobs  into  lower-paid  positions  that 
provide  fewer  opportunities  for  advancement  into  higher-wage  positions. 
Although  an  able-bodied  and  moderately  resourceful  welfare  recipient 
can  almost  certainly  find  employment  if  she  is  willing  to  accept  low 
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wages  and  a  meager  package  of  fringe  benefits,  it  is  those  very  working 
conditions  that  create  her  welfare-to-work  dilemma.  Jobs  may  exist,  but 
they  will  not  suffice  to  support  a  family  unless  accompanied  by  an  array 
of  support  services.  It  is  simply  unrealistic  to  expect  that  all  single 
women  with  young  children  will  be  able  to  work  full-time,  year-round. 
Many  will  choose  to  work  part-time  so  as  to  make  child  rearing  more 
feasible.  Others  will  spend  part  of  the  year  without  jobs  as  a  result  of 
involuntary  unemployment,  illness,  or  difficulty  in  arranging  child  care 
(Burtless  1995). 
Eliminating  the  major  welfare  programs  would  certainly  make  the  EITC 
essential  as  a  labor  market  subsidy.  But  the  ElTC  alone  is  not  enough  to 
support  a  family  given  current  labor  market  conditions.  Those  who 
advocate  time  limits  for  benefits  simply  fail  to  consider  the  “damper  that 
the  low  end  of  the  labor  market  places  on  opportunities  for  low-educated 
workers”  (Haveman  1995).  The  decline  in  earnings  opportunities  for 
less-skilled  workers  needs  to  be  addressed  for  welfare-to-work  programs 
to  lead  recipients  toward  self-sufficiency. 
The  role  of  public  policy,  then,  should  be  to  further  the  goals  of  society 
in  a  positive  and  constructive  way,  as  opposed  to  a  negative  and  harmful 
way.  A  positive  approach  would  he  to  offer  an  inducement  to  work  by 
making  work  pay.  Such  an  approach  would  involve  a  whole  new  way  of 
thinking  about  how  the  welfare  state  is  administered,  what  the  goals  of 
the  welfare  state  ought  to  be,  and  how  its  various  programs  can  he  syn- 
chronized  to  achieve  its  goals. 
A  Program  for  Consoliiated  Assiitance 
The  Congressional  Budget  Office  estimated  the  1994  cost  of  AFLX  at 
$23  billion,  food  stamps  at  $24  billion,  and  Medicaid  at  $140  billion 
(Congressional  Budget  Office  1994).  The  total  cost  of  the  major  public 
assistance  programs  is  $187  billion.  In  addition,  the  1996  cost  of  the 
EITC  is  projected  at  $24.5  b.11’  1  ran.  The  federal  government  is  spending 
in  excess  of  $210  billion  on  these  programs  for  the  poor.  The  actual  cost 
of  the  welfare  state  is  considerably  more,  however,  as  the  $210  billion 
does  not  even  begin  to  take  into  account  a  number  of  other  assistance Refmning  Welfare  by S~hroni~  Public  Assismnce  Benefits 
programs,  such  as  public  housing,  nutrition  programs,  educational  pro- 
grams,  and  school  lunches.  Despite  their  cost  and  number,  there  has 
been  little  coordination  of  existing  welfare  progmms.  And,  there  has 
been  relatively  little  coordination  of  the  parallel  systems  created  by  the 
tax  programs  and  the  public  assistance  programs.  As  a  result,  the  current 
welfare  system  has  become  “inequitable,  inefficient,  overly  complicated> 
and  expensive  to  administer”  (Forman  1993,418). 
Given  that  nonworking  or  minimum-wage-earning  welfare  recipients 
should  derive  the  greatest  benefit  from  the  EITC,  one  solution  to  the 
current  welfare  problem  is  to  find  a  way  in  which  the  program  can  be 
restructured  or  synchronized  with  other  programs  so  that  it  (1)  assists 
those  who  most  need  it  and  (2)  creates  a  positive  inducement  to  work  so 
that  individuals  are  able  to  achieve  a  degree  of  self-sufficiency.  To  put  it 
another  way,  could  the  $210  billion  currently  .spent  on  the  major  welfare 
programs  and  the  EITC  be  spent  on  another,  better-coordinated  set  of 
programs  devised  to  accomplish  these  objectives?  Such  a  positive  inter- 
action  might  be  achieved  through  the  consolidation  of  these  programs 
into  a  plan  offered  through  the  tax  code.  Although  the  CAP  does  not 
take  regional  differences  in  the  cost  of  living  into  account,  its  goals  are 
to  encourage  work,  to  deliver  fair  and  equitable  benefits,  and  to  do  both 
efficiently. 
Goals  of  Welfare  Reform 
Although  welfare  reform  should  seek  to  move  people  off  the  rolls  by 
making  work  pay,  it  first  should  acknowledge  the  importance  of  provid- 
ing  basic  assistance  to  those  who,  for  whatever  reason,  will  not  be  able  to 
work.  With  this  understanding,  welfare  reform  should  be  predicated  on 
four  principles. 
Work  allows  people  to  be  seIf-sufficient  and  confers  dignity.  It  social- 
izes  people  into  the  common  project  of  society  in  which  they  all  work 
together  as  equal  citizens. 
Children  should  be  adequately  provided  for.  This  support  should, 
when  possible,  come  from  their  family.  Fathers  have  a  responsibility 
to  support  their  children;  a  welfare  system  should  aim  to  ensure  that 
fathers  contribute  to  their  children’s  support. 
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l  A  person  who  works  should  not  be  penalized  economically  for  doing  so. 
l  Positive  incentives  to  work  should  not  vary  regionally,  but  should  be 
uniform  throughout  the  country. 
The  New  Program: CAP 
Return  to  the  example  of  the  mother  who  has  two  children  and  lives  in 
Pennsylvania.  If  she  did  not  work,  she  would  receive  $7,548  in  benefits 
($5,052  in  AFDC  and  $2,494  in  food  stamps)  plus  health  coverage 
through  Medicaid.  The  program  proposed  here-the  consolidated  assis- 
tance  program  (CAP&would  do  away  with  the  distinctions  between 
AFDC  and  food  stamps  and  instead  would  consist  of  two  basic  compo- 
nents:  a  child  support  component  and  an  assistance  component. 
The  child  support  component  would  be  modeled  along  the  lines  sug- 
gested  by  Garfinkel  (1992).  A  minimum  assured  benefit  for  children- 
between  $2,000  and  $2,500  for  the  first  child,  $1,000  each  for  the 
second  and  third  child,  and  $500  each  for  the  fourth,  fifth,  and  sixth 
child-would  be  provided  through  a  child  support  assurance  system 
(CSAS).  The  cost  of  the  CSAS  would  be  shared  by  known  fathers  and 
the  government.  For  children  whose  paternal  support  is  less  than  the 
minimum  assured  benefit,  the  government  would  pay  the  difference. 
Children  whose  paternal  support  exceeds  the  assured  benefit  would 
receive  no  assistance  through  the  CSAS. 
The  assistance  component  of  the  CAP  would  be  available  to  both  those 
who  cannot  find  work  and  those  who  are  working.  The  assistance  corn- 
ponent  for  nonworkers  would  consist  of  a  maximum  benefit  based  on  the 
existing  annual  median  state  AFDC  benefit.  (In  1994  the  monthly 
median  state  benefit  for  a  nonworking  mother  with  two  children  was 
$366,  or  an  annual  benefit  of  $4,392.) 
The  assistance  component  of  the  CAP  for  workers  would  be  modeled 
along  the  lines  of  the  current  EITC.  It  would  provide  a  positive  incen- 
tive  to  work  by  offering  a  maximum  credit  of  $5,500  to  anybody  who 
worked  and  earned  between  $8,425  and  $11,000.  As  such,  this  compo- 
nent  of  the  CAP  would  be  similar  to  the  existing  EITC.  Total  benefits 
would  still  be  based  on  earnings  in  one  of  three  income  ranges,  although 
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Table  7  Disposable  Income  Under  the  Proposed  CAF’ 
Income  and  Expenses 
Nonworking  Working 
Recipient  Recipient 
Income 
Earnings 
Assistance  component 
Child  support  component 
Total 
$0  $8,840 
4,392  5,500 
3,500  3,500 
$7,892  $17,840 
Expemes 
Taxes 
Child  care 
Other 
Total 
Ikpossblc  income 
$0  $4478) 
0  (2,000) 
0  (700) 
0  $DFQ- 
$7,892  $14,462 
Nota:  Earnings  are  those  of  one  petsan  working  full~tirne  at  the 
minimum  wage.  The  assistance  component  for  the  nonworking 
recipient  assutnes  two  chiklten. 
benefits  in  the  phase-in  range  would  be  expanded  and  the  level  of  quali- 
fying  income  in  the  phase-out  range  would  be  narrowed  from  those 
under  the  existing  EITC.  Specifically,  benefits  would  equal  65.1  percent 
of  earnings  in  the  phase-in  range  (earnings  up  to  $8,425);  $5,500  (the 
maximum  credit  in  the  phase-in  range)  for  earnings  in  the  stationary 
range  (earnings  between  $8,425  to  $11,000);  and  would  decline  at  a  rare 
of  61.1  percent  on  earnings  in  the  phase-out  range  (earnings  between 
$11,001  and  $20,000).  Unlike  the  current  EITC  (and  the  CSAS  compo- 
nent),  the  assistance  component  of  the  CAP  for  workers  would  not  be 
tied  to  the  number  of  children  in  the  household.’ 
Total  benefits  for  a  mother  with  two  children,  then,  would  be  $7,892  for 
the  nonworking  family  ($4,392  in  assistance  benefits  and  $3,500  in 
CSAS  benefits).  Working  families  would  receive  a  maximum  benefit  of 
$9,000  ($5,500  in  assistance  benefits  and  $3,500  in  CSAS  benefits). 
Table  7  provides  a  comparison  of  effective  incomes  for  a  working  and 
nonworking  family  with  two  children. 
Under  this  benefit  structure  beneficiaries  do  not  lose  anything  by  going 
to  work;  the  net  income  gain  of  almost  $7,000  means  that  the  person  in 
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our  example  is  better  off  working.  And  although  the  maximum  credit  for 
working  families  under  the  CAP  would  be  considerably  larger  than  the 
maximum  credit  allowed  under  the  EITC  in  1996,  the  increase  is  par- 
tially  offset  by  the  narrowing  of  income  parameters  and  the  higher  rate 
at  which  the  credit  declines  in  the  phase-out  ranges. 
In  addition,  although  the  higher  phase-out  rate  under  this  scheme  as 
compared  to  the  current  EITC  (61.1  percent  versus  26.10  percent)  does 
create  a  work  disincentive  for  incomes  at  the  higher  range  of  the  credit, 
any  disincentive  could  be  offset  by  maintaining  the  CSAS  component 
for  workers  with  incomes  up  to  at  least  $27,000. 
There  are  two  reasons  why  the  CSAS,  or  at  least  the  government  por- 
tion  of  the  child  support  subsidy,  should  be  extended  to  incomes  above 
the  maximum  level  at  which  the  working  assistance  benefit  is  allowed. 
First,  children  simply  deserve  our  support  regardless  of  family  income.  If 
we  are  a  nation  purporting  to  uphold  family  values,  we  should  be  ready 
to  support  our  most  precious  resource.  This  is  simple  justice. 
Second,  we  do  not  want  to  take  away  all  benefits  from  those  at  the  upper 
end  of  the  current  EITC  phase-out  range,  as  they  are  not  truly  wealthy. 
As  a  matter  of  fairness,  as  part  of  the  lower-middle  class,  they  should  still 
receive  some  relief  following  synchronization.  As  shown  in  Table  8,  most 
single  mothers  with  earnings  at  the  upper  end  of  the  current  EITC 
phase-out  range  will  do  as  well  under  the  new  program  as  under  the  cur- 
rent  scheme. 
It  is  true  that  under  the  CAP  marginal  tax  rates  are  rather  high  for  earn- 
ings  between  $11,000  and  $20,000;  overall,  however,  a  single  mother 
with  two  children  would  have  a  higher  income  under  the  new  program 
than  she  would  under  the  old  one.  Even  atier  food  stamps  are  added  to 
the  incomes  of  mothers  with  earnings  of,  say,  $16,000  under  existing 
programs,  these  mothers  still  fare  better  under  the  new  program.  It 
should  also  be  noted  that  mothers  with  more  than  two  children  would 
receive  more  under  the  new  program  (as  a  result  of  increased  CSAS  pay- 
ments)  than  under  the  old  program  (as  EITC  benefits  do  not  increase  for 
families  with  more  than  two  children).  Moreover,  CSAS  is  a  minimum 
for  child  support;  children  whme  court  awards  for  paternal  support  were 
higher  would  receive  more  support. Reforming  Welfare  by  Synchrmiting  Pubk  Assistance Eknefits 
Table  8  Comparison  of  the  Disposable  Income  of  a  WorKmg  Mother  Under 
Existing  Programs  and  the  CAP 
CAP  Existing  Programs 
Gross  FOOd  Gross 
Earnings  Assistance  CSAS  Income  Stamps  EITC  Income 
$11,000  $5,500  $3,500  $20,000  $1,974  $3,370  $16,344 
12,000  4,899  3,500  20,389  1,733  3,159  16,892 
14,000  3,667  3,500  21,167  1,250  2,738  17,988 
16,000  2,445  3,5Qo  21,945  775  2,317  19,092 
18,000  1,223  3,500  22,723  293  1,896  20,189 
20,000  0  3,500  23,500  0  1,475  21,475 
22,000  0  3,500  25,500  0  1,053  23,053 
24,000  0  3,500  27,500  0  632  24,632 
26,000  0  3,500  29,500  0  211  26,211 
27,000  0  3,500  30,500  0  0  27,000 
Nore; Calculation  of  benefits under existing program5 assumes a  Emily  of  a  single  mother 
with two children. 
Finally,  in  order  to  address  the  issue  of  health  care  insurance,  under  the 
CAP  Medicaid  benefits  would  be  extended  for  one  year  for  those  who  go 
to  work  (as  is  currently  the  case  under  the  Family  Support  Act  of  1988). 
It  should  be  pointed  out  that  such  an  extension  might  not  entirely  solve 
the  problem  of  health  care  for  these  families.  Mothers  with  children 
might  find  that,  despite  the  CAP  benefits,  once  their  Medicaid  expires, 
they  can  no  longer  afford  to  work.  On  the  other  hand,  it  might  well  be 
that  a  year  of  consistent  work  might  socialize  these  mothers  into  work 
patterns  and  provide  them  with  an  adequate  work  history  so  that  if  their 
employers  were  not  providing  private  insurance,  they  might  be  in  a  bet- 
ter  position  to  find  jobs  that  did  offer  health  benefits. 
Extending  benefits  beyond  a  year  raises  the  issue  of  fairness  to  people 
who  have  been  working  but  have  not  been  able  to  afford  health  insur- 
ance.  Why  should  free  health  insurance  be  available  to  welfare  moth- 
ers  ready  to  go  to  work,  but  not  to  those  who  have  been  working? 
There  is  no  easy  way  to  answer  this  question.  Certainly,  health  care 
reform  would  also  contribute  to  welfare  reform.  The  reason  for  not  cut- 
ting  off  Medicaid  for  newly  working  welfare  mothers  is  that  they 
should  not  he  penalized  for  doing  what  society  has  demanded  of  them; 
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fairness  would  dictate  that  the  umbrella  be  extended  to  cover  mothers 
who  are  currently  working,  rather  than  contracted  so  that  it  does  not 
cover  those  who  are  not  newly  working. 
Budgetary  Effects  and  Financing  Proposals 
The  estimated  cost  of  the  assistance  component  of  the  CAP  for  non 
working  mothers  is  essentially  the  same  as  the  current  cost  of  the  AFDC 
program.  Because  the  food  stamp  program  would  be  eliminated  under 
this  proposal,  the  $24  billion  currently  spent  on  food  stamps  could  be 
transferred  to  offset  government  spending  for  the  CSAS  program. 
The  assistance  component  of  the  CAP  for  nonworking  mothers  would 
be  administered  through  the  same  tax  system  as  the  assistance  compo. 
nent  of  the  CAP  for  working  recipients,  which  would  mean  that  non- 
working  mothers  would  have  to  file  a  tax  return  in  order  to  receive  basic 
assistance.  Such  a  reorganization  would  eliminate  the  current  AFDC 
bureaucracy,  for  a  potential  savings  of  $3  billion  in  federal  administrative 
costs  in  addition  to  administrative  cost  savings  associated  with  the  elimi- 
nation  of  the  food  stamp  program. 
A  best  guess  of  total  expenditures  for  the  CAP  is  that  they  would  be 
somewhat  less  than  the  costs  of  the  current,  three-program  system. 
The  CSAS  component  would  be  paid  for  in  part  by  fathers.  The  worst- 
case  scenario-in  which  no  father  makes  payments-would  cost  the 
government  an  estimated  $17.5  billion.’  (Benefit  costs  would,  of 
course,  run  higher  if  the  CSAS  were  extended  to  those  with  incomes 
up  to  $27,000  or  if  the  average  recipient  family  size  were  to  increase.) 
Estimated  costs  for  the  assistance  component  of  the  CAP  range  from 
$22  billion  (if  nobody  works  and  only  nonworking  benefits  are  paid)  to 
$27.5  billion  (if  everyone  works  and  only  working  benefits  are  paid).” 
Estimated  costs  for  the  entire  CAP,  then,  would  be  a  maximum  of  $45 
billion  (and  likely  less).  Tl  ’  1  IIS  eve  o  spending  appears  reasonable  1  f 
when  compared  to  the  $50  billion  currently  paid  for  the  AFDC  and 
food  stamp  programs  ($47  billion  in  program  costs  plus  $3  billion  in 
administrative  costs  for  AFDC). 
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It  is  true  that  some  of  those  who  already  file  for  the  EITC  would  have 
earnings  that  fall  within  the  eligible  range  of  income  to  receive  working 
benefits  under  the  CAP,  which  would  add  to  the  cost  of  that  component. 
But  capping  the  working  component  of  the  CAP  at  earnings  of  $20,000 
eliminates  perhaps  one-third  of  those  who  currently  are  eligible  for  the 
EITC.  The  elimination  of  those  with  earnings  between  $20,001  and 
$27,000  would  save  at  least  $8.5  billion.  Moreover,  many  who  now  file 
for  the  EITC  and  also  receive  food  stamps  would  no  longer  be  receiving 
food  stamps,  which  would  result  in  additional  savings.  However,  as  men- 
tioned  above,  those  eligible  for  benefits  under  the  new  program  would 
receive  more  than  under  the  current  system. 
In  summary,  the  hodgepodge  of  current  programs  now  costs  around  $2  10 
billion.  The  consolidated  assistance  program  would  cost  roughly  the 
same  as  current  programs,  and  possibly  $3  to  $5  billion  less.  Some  addi- 
tional  administrative  savings  from  the  food  stamp  program  might  be  real- 
ized.  But  even  if  this  proposal  were  to  cost  more  than  the  current  pro- 
grams,  the  new  program  for  welfare  reform  would  address  in  a  positive 
and  constructive  way  the  issue  of  work  incentives  and  disincentives  pre- 
sent  in  the  current  system  (Aaron  1973). 
Conclusion 
The  goal  of  welfare  reform  is  to  make  work  pay.  True  welfare  reform, 
then,  will  involve  more  than  marginal  changes  of  existing  programs;  it 
will  require  making  work  a  more  economically  attractive  option.  If  the 
EITC  is  to  be  a  staple  of  such  reform,  the  credit  would  need  a  more  dras- 
tic  alteration  than  a  simple  expansion  coupled  with  a  two-year  time 
limit  on  AFDC  benefits.  Welfare  reform  requires  a  synchronization  of 
benefits  so  that  the  system  can  move  people  from  welfare  to  work  and 
ensure  that  those  who  do  so  are  not  penalized  because  they  chose  to  do 
what  society  wants  and  demands  of  them. 
The  consolidated  assistance  program  collapses  existing  welfare  and  work 
incentive  programs  into  one  program  without  increasing  the  federal  bud- 
get.  The  CAP  offers  a  positive  inducement  to  work  while  ensuring  that 
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work,  to  deliver  fair  and  equitable  benefits,  and  to  do  so  efficiently.” 
Efficiency  is,  of  course,  defined  by  many  as  spending  less  money;  reducing 
spending  often  entails  reducing  and  streamlining  programs.  The  tradi- 
tional  means  by  which  federal  government  programs  have  been  cut  have 
been  consolidation  into  block  grants  and  transfer  of  responsibility  to  the 
states.  If  as  a  result  of  the  implementation  of  the  program  sug- 
gested  hem,  the  federal  government  spent  less,  the  achievement  of  effi- 
ciency  could  be  claimed  by  some.  However,  such  a  definition  of  efficiency 
may  well  be  too  narrow.  Efficiency  in  government  can  also  lx  defiied  as 
the  best  possible  use  of  resources  or  the  least  costly  way  to  achieve  the 
objectives  formally  established  in  the  policy-making  process.  In  terms  of 
welfare,  many  people  believe  that  those  objectives  are  to  encourage  peo- 
ple  to  work  and  not  to  wantonly  allow  children  to  starve.  If,  through  the 
synchronization  of  benefits,  these  objectives  can  be  accomplished  (and  in 
a  positive  manner),  then,  by  definition,  government  will  have  become 
more  efficient.  Moreover,  synchronization  of  benefits  is  in  the  spirit  of 
President  Clinton’s  program  for  reinventing  government.  This  program, 
then,  could  serve  as  a  major  step  in  the  effort  to  reform  government  as 
well  as  to  reform  the  welfare  system.  The  effect  of  synchronization  of  hen- 
efits  along  the  lines  of  the  consolidated  assistance  program  should  be 
greater  efficiency  and  greater  labor  market  activity,  that  is,  more  people 
applying  for  jobs  and  entering  the  private  labor  market. 
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Appendix.  Regional  Variation  in  Welfare  Benefits 
Under  existing  welfare  programs,  states  (or  localities)  set  benefit  levels. 
Variation  across  regional  and  state  boundaries  means  that  the  EITC  (as 
ctirrently  structured)  offers  greater  incentives  to  work  in  states  in  which 
AFDC  benefits  are  considerably  less  generous. 
Consider  the  following  example.  In  the  state  of  New  York,  a  single,  non- 
working  mother  with  two  children  receives  $6,924  in  AFDC  benefits 
and  approximately  $1,934  in  food  stamp  benefits,  or  $8,858  in  total  ben- 
efits.”  If  the  value  of  Medicaid,  which  in  New  York  is  equal  to  $4,790 
($2,214  per  adult  and  $1,288  per  child),  is  added  to  this  figure,  our 
mother  has  an  income  value  equal  to  $13,648  (see  Table  Al  ). 
Table Al  Comparison  of  Benefit  Levels  for  Nonworking  and  Working 
Mothers  in  New  York  and  Texas 
Nonworking,  Nonworking, 
New  York  Texas  Worlcmg 
Earnings  (a4.35  per  hour)  $0  $0 
AFDC  6,924  2,208 
Food  stamps  1,934  3,34Y 
Taxes  0  0 
Child  care  0  0 
Other  expenses  0  0 
EITCI  0  0 
Medicaid  4,790  2,992 








Sources:  U.S.  House  of  Representatives,  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means,  Overview  of 
Entirbnent  Propurns:  7%  Green  Book,  I994  (Washington,  D.C.:  U.S.  Government 
Priming  Office,  1994),  761-769;  “The  Earned  Income  Credit-Integrating  Tax  and 
Welfare  Provisions,”  Tax  Notes,  no.  7,  July  1994;  and  Mary  Jo  Bane  and  David  T. 
ElIwood,  Weffure  RecxIities:  From  Rhetoric  to  R&m  (Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard 
Unive&y  Pre5s,  1994). 
However,  if  this  same  mother  worked  full-time  for  slightly  more  than  the 
minimum  wage  ($4.35  per  hour),  received  food  stamp  benefits,  and 
claimed  the  EITC,  her  gross  annual  income  would  equal  $14,860.  We 
must,  however,  account  for  the  costs  associated  with  work  not  borne  by 
the  nonworking  mother.  To  recalculate  net  income,  we  subtract  from 
gross  monthly  income  the  costs  of  taxes  ($678),  child  care  ($2,000),  and The  Con.solk~‘~~d  Assismnce  Program 
other  expenses  f$700).13  To  this  figure  we  add  $2,442  in  food  stamp  hen 
efits  {$295  -  .30  [income  -  $13  I  -  (earned  income  x  .20)  -  child  care]} 
and  $3,370  from  the  EITC,  which  yields  an  annual  net  income  of 
$11,482.  Given  the  benefit  structure  in  New  York,  then,  the  woman 
would  have  little  incentive  to  work  at  a  minimum-wage  job. 
Regional  variation  further  complicates  the  issue  of  work  incentives.  For 
instance,  as  shown  in  Table  Al,  the  monthly  AFDC  grant  in  Texas  is  $184, 
or  $2,208  for  a  twelve-month  period.  The  single,  nonworking  mother 
would  also  be  entitled  to  $3,349  in  food  stamp  benefits,  yielding  $5,557  in 
total  benefits.  If  the  value  of  Medicaid,  which  in  Texas  is  $2,992  ($1,542 
per  adult  and  $725  per  child),  is  added  to  this  figure,  our  mother  has  an 
income  value  equal  to  $8,549.  in  Texas,  then,  a  mother  would  receive  a 
higher  net  income  by  working  at  the  minimum  wage,  receiving  food  stamp 
benefits,  and  claiming  the  EITC  than  she  would  by  not  working  at  all. 
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Notes 
The  difference  between  the  family’s  earnings  and  earnings  at  the  upper  end 
of  the  stationary  range  is  $17,000  -  $11,000  =  $6,000.  Multiply  this 
amount  by  the  percentage  applicable  to  the  phase-out  range,  that  is, 
$6,000  x  2106  =  $1,263.60.  Subtracting  this  amount  from  the  maximum 
credit,  $3,370  -  $1,264  =  $2,106,  yields  the  amount  of  the  family’s ElTC. 
If,  say,  $3,5Oil  of  the  total  $30,000  is  investment  income,  the  family  would 
be  eligible  for  the  EITC  on  $26,500  (the  earned  portion  of  their  total 
income),  still  within  the  phase-out  mnge. 
Tbc  number  of  hours  considered  equivalent  to  full-time  work  is 2,080,  that 
is,  40  hours  per  week,  52  weeks  per  year. 
This  assumes  that  the  mother  working  at  the  minimum  wage  would  not 
receive  employer-paid  health  care  benefits  and  that  such  benefits  could  be 
obtained  at  a  cost  equivalent  to  the  average  value  of  Medicaid  benefits. 










In  a  quantitative  model  dummy  varialdcs  arc  used  to  quantifi  qualitative 
attributes.  “Such  qualitative  variables  usually  indicate  the  presence  or 
absence  of  a  ‘quality’  or  an  attribute,”  such  as  male  or  female,  black  or 
white,  AFDC  recipient  or  nonrecipicnt,  thought  to  be  factors  that  influ- 
ence  the  variable(s)  being  modeled  (Gujarati  1992).  These  attributes  are 
quantified  by  constructing  “artificial  variables”  that  take  on  values  of  1  or 
0,  indicating  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  attribute  in  question. 
These  figures  were  provided  to  me  by  the  Center  on  Budget  and’Policy 
Priorities,  whose  source  was  the  Congressional  Budget  Office. 
lt  also  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the  slow  growth  of  the  American  econ- 
omy  since  the  early  1970s  has  been  at  least  part  of  the  cause  of  the  rise  of 
incomes  at  the  top  of  the  income  distribution  and  the  fall  of  those  at  the 
bottom  (see,  for  example,  Papadimitriou  and  Wolff  1993,  Wolff  1994, 
Hungerford  199.3,  Phillips  1990,  and  Levy  1988).  Had  there  been  sufficient 
economic  growth,  the  current  discussion  about  welfare  and  the  ElTC 
might  be  unnecessary. 
The  benefits  to  working  families  suggested  here  would  essentially  be  no  dif- 
ferent  from  the  ‘expansion  of  the  EITC  suggested  by  Bane  and  Ellwood, 
who  would  have  tripled  the  1992  value  of  the  ElTC  from  $1,800  to 
$5,400.  Bane  and  Elwood  also  would  have  eliminated  food  stamps  but,  in 
addition,  would  have  raised  the  minimum  wage  from  $4.25  to  $5.50  (Bane 
and  Ellwood  1994,148-150). 
This  figure  is derived  by  multiplying  the  current  number  of  AFDC  families 
by  the  maximum  CSAS  benefit  for  a  family  with  two  children  ($3,500). 
These  figures  are  derived  by  multiplying  the  entire  current  AFDC  caseload 
by  the  maximum  nonworking  benefit  of  $4,392  (to  arrive  at  the  $22  bil- 
lion  figure)  and  by  multiplying  the  entire  caseload  by  the  maximum  work- 
ing  benefit  of  $S,SCM (to  arrive  at  the  $27.5  billion  figure). 
These  proposals  are  similar  in  spirit  to  those  of  Robert  Haveman,  who 
advocates  reforming  the  welfare  system  to  achieve  equity  and  efficiency 
(Haveman  1988).  His  idea  is  to  gcncratc  opportunities,  offer  effective 
incentives  to  work,  and  make  individuals  responsible  for  their  own  actions. 
The  CAP’s  child  support  component  flows  from  Haveman’s  uniform  child 
support  system,  in  which  the  message  to  fathers  is  that  they  must  support 
their  children. 
The  value  of  monthly  food  stamp  benefits  is  equal  to  the  maximum  allow- 
able  benefit  ($29.5  for  households  containing  three  people)  minus  30  per- 
cent  of  monthly  counted  income.  Counted  income  is  defined  as  gross 
monthly  income  minus  a  standard  deduction  of  $13  1  minus  20  percent  ‘of 
monthly  earned  income  minus  monthly  dependent  care  expenses  up  to 
$175,per_depende,nt  over  age  twoand  $210  per  child  under  the  age  of  two 
(U.S.  House  of  Representatives  1994,761-769). 
The  tax  figure  is  from  Ta  Policy  Note  (1994).  The  $2,000  expense  for 
child  care,  based  on  the  figures,.used  .in  tables  2  and  4,  is  based  on  the 
assumptions  many  make  with  regard  to  what  a  mother  with  two  children 
ought  to  expect  to  pay  for  these  services  (see,  for  example,  Bane  and 
Ellwood  1994,146-147;  and  Trrx  Poky  Note  1994). 
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